At the time the Arab world is facing six strategic changes (discussed in the first article of this series), and confronts the question of whether there is one or more political Arab worlds (discussed in the second article of the series), six non-Arab political projects are trying to reform the region and shape its future for their respective, often clashing, objectives.

The first is the Turkish project, which has achieved notable successes recently. Turkey was the key force behind the advance of militant Islamist groups from northern Syria south to Damascus and large parts of the country, and their ability to topple the Assad regime and ascend to power. This success entails several aspects.

One — This success marks Turkey’s return to the Levant after a century since its withdrawal with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey returns not merely as a power able to cajole and convince, but primarily as a power able to mould political circumstances to what it considers its strategic goals in the region.

Two — Moulding circumstances in Syria entails having political, military, economic, and intelligence resources in areas beyond Turkey. Turkey has always been a key power in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the presence of Turkish assets, or assets over which Turkey has significant influence, beyond Turkish borders signify a new strategic posture Turkey has never had in the region in over a century.

Three — Turkey understands that this new - or resuscitated from history - strategic positioning alarms a number of powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. These powers comprehend that such strategic positioning is never temporary. A country with Turkey’s decision-making sophistication would not carve such a strategic positioning if it was not determined to preserve it for the foreseeable future. This means that Turkey’s relationships with several Eastern Mediterranean countries will soon undergo changes.

Four — some of these changes will exacerbate old tensions; some will stir new ones; and some will entail new strategic calculations. But underpinning these changes would be a realisation by most Eastern Mediterranean countries that Turkey has just taken the most assertive step in almost a century to orient its strategic positioning towards the south, towards the Arab world, rather than towards Europe.

Five — For many Arab countries, and for Israel, this marks the entry, in a much more significant way into Middle Eastern politics, by a serious power: the second largest army in NATO, a significant demography, a sizeable economy with solid exporting power, and before and after, a proud nation that had a decisive influence over the Middle East for over 400 years.

Six — Turkey commands one of the most interesting and important geographic locations in the world, at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and north eastern Africa. Turkey’s building a potentially long-term strategic presence at a key corner of the Eastern Mediterranean has repercussions beyond the Middle East. Europe, the US, and Russia took note. And already, the three have begun to approach Turkey in different ways, in light of its recent foray and success. The US and Russia might well have reservations but also see areas of cooperation with Turkey as it attempts to consolidate this new strategic positioning. Europe partly sees this step as arguably one way for Turkey to negotiate with Europe on multiple dossiers in which Turkey has leverage and that are important for Europe, particularly the future of irregular migration from the southern eastern Mediterranean to Europe.

Seven — Turkey’s return to the Levant and the changes it backed in Syria have strengthened political Islam. And although political Islam has never gone away even after its defeat at the hands of nationalist secular forces in much of the Arab world in the past decade, still the change in Syria, and Turkey’s new positioning in the region, has given a strong momentum political Islam - with all of its different facets and streams - have not had in over a decade. This will have implications, not only on domestic politics in several Middle Eastern countries, but also on the strategies of different countries in the region concerning dealing with pan-regional political Islamist forces.

And eight — This change in Turkey’s strategic positioning comes at a significant moment in the country’s history. The Turkish Republic celebrates a century since its emergence from the death throes of the Ottoman Empire. And after several tumults throughout that century, Turkey seems to have internalised ways of coexistence between constituents of its society with opposing views on not only sociopolitics, but also on the idea of what the Turkish identity means. And so, Turkey is returning to the Middle East and the Arab world in search of more than specific political opportunities and economic interests; arguably Turkey is returning in pursuit of a dimension of its historical identity that has been in the shadows in the past century. But resuscitating that dimension clashes with other strategic interests being pursued in the region right now, as well as clashes with other regional countries’ conceptions of their national identities.