President Trump’s apparent strategic orientations have brought to the surface concerns Europe has felt for at least a decade, but has not processed before. That is, for at least a decade, Europe has sensed that the future of the defence architecture it has enjoyed since the late 1940s was increasingly looking far from certain. America’s pivot to Asia, during the presidency of Barrack Obama, was the capstone of efforts over the past two decades, by various American institutions within and without the government, to entrench political, military, economic, and financial power in different parts of Asia. Of course, America has had major presence in Asia since the end of World War Two, but the efforts over the past two decades were the result of assessments, as well as feelings, that serious challenges to American hegemony in the foreseeable future would come from Asia.

Opportunities also underpinned how American power circles, whether in government or the private sector, saw Asia. Asia - primarily but not only China - presented challenges, but also seemed abound with opportunities for the well capitalised, the sophisticated, and the patient actors that were willing to sow seeds and wait for them to yield in the future. And so, America’s pivot towards Asia was anchored not only in mitigating risks but also in seeking new fortunes.

Feelings matter. America, which remains a relatively youthful country in terms of demographics, and where capitalism’s animal spirits are easily stirred and arguably were never tamed, were increasingly drawn towards Asia, a vibrant continent witnessing the most transformative social changes in the world, and to which the centre of gravity of many industries have been moving for at least a decade. By comparison, in the eyes of many in America, Europe has, for many years, seemed to be growing more content with its riches and status quo, and arguably anxious at the prospects of animal spirits looming over its quiet milieu.

And so, Europe had a vague place in America’s strategic assessments. In one view, Europe hardly featured, for, quite often, American thinking was anchored on classic great powers dynamics, in which hard power, the ability to compel others and steer developments ruled supreme. Those who lacked the means of imposing their interests were not considered great powers, and so did not command prominent places in assessments concerning the future.

In another view, Europe featured as a pillar of the Western alliance, which was a cornerstone of American geopolitical positioning, and of the world that America had played the most significant role in shaping in the past seven decades. But that alliance, in the assessments of the seriously influential American institutions, was decisively led by the United States. American leadership here meant that America has been shouldering the ultimate responsibility for the defence of the entire Western alliance, and with that came major burdens, but also came unrivalled and unquestioned prerogatives. The inherent understanding, at least within these American institutions, was that there was a hierarchy inside the alliance.

President Trump’s nascent geopolitical positioning confirms the pivot to Asia, underscores the great powers dynamic, emphasises the implied hierarchy, dilutes the responsibilities that America assumed in the previous decades, expects Europe to rapidly shoulder major economic and financial obligations in the Western alliance’s defence architecture, and before and after, exudes a highly assertive expression of these capitalistic animal spirits. Some observers in Europe focused on President Trump’s rhetoric, which indeed was not only a major departure from the subtle and nuanced messaging typically employed in international diplomacy, and especially in intra-Western relations, but was also a shock. But rhetoric is the least of what concerns Europe now, because President Trump’s geopolitics overhaul the foundations upon which European defence has rested for seven decades. And what underscores the concern is the clear realisation, in Europe, that these changes do not stem from the ideas of one man or a highly powerful group within the American Republican Party, but that President Trump is the most blatant expression and enforcer of trends that have been brewing and unfolding in American strategic thinking for many years.

Now Europe faces questions it has not confronted in many decades. The primary question concerns the future of its defence architecture, and how that can relate to the future of the Western alliance’s defences in general. But behind thinking about defence and geopolitics, there lurk tough questions about the meaning of the European project, the realistic scenarios about its future, what serious strategic objectives there are for Europe as a political collective, what resources Europe as a whole can muster towards these objectives, and importantly is there a collective will behind these objectives. The next article in this series will attempt delineating these questions.