Scoping the parameters of European defence necessitates defining what is being defended, and assessing the degree to which European societies agree on the priorities, and on the values behind these priorities.

Europe agrees on many premises concerning its defence. All European societies agree on a collective cultural notion that brings them together. Simple as it might appear, this consensus is a serious achievement for the European project as a whole. This is because, not only many of these European societies had bitterly fought each other for centuries, including in the Second World War, the most devastating struggle in human history, but also because these societies had diverse historical trajectories which had moulded vastly different collective consciousness. For these societies to agree on a common cultural framework is a major achievement.

Europe believes in that cultural framework. Despite acute reservations across different parts of Europe about the European project, there is a near consensus across the Continent that its cultural framework is the epitome of societal refinement throughout human history. And so, whereas large sections of European societies have frustrations concerning many aspects of European political and economical policies, at the core of the European collective consciousness there is a belief that the European cultural experience over the past few centuries has been more successful than any other cultural experience in the world in the same time span. This makes the idea of Europe worth defending.

Despite all of that, the notion of a collective European defence faces difficult questions - particularly when Europe stops reflecting on its own cultural and economic successes, and begins to think about the parameters of its defence, for example, who are its true allies, and who are its opponents, do these opponents qualify as enemies, what are Europe’s objectives vis a vis each of those, what are the challenges and threats they present, and how will Europe confront those opponents and avert these threats.

These questions stir problems because there is no wide agreements on their answers. For example, European societies have vastly different views about their relationship with the US, especially as the right secures its rise in America. Europe also see the western alliance and the values it supposedly stands for, through different lenses. European societies differ on how they see the future of their relationships with powers such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, and others. There are different, and often contradictory, conceptions of allies, partners, opponents, and enemies.

Rhetoric buys time, and time helps bridge gaps between ideas. This is why the idea of Europe’s strategic autonomy has gained traction in the past few years, for strategic autonomy allows for varied interpretations and elastic definitions. But, this flexibility opens the doors for many devils to reside in the details.

The first of these devils concerns defining the objectives entailed in the notion of strategic autonomy. Often European strategists have tried to eschew major dossiers on which European opinions vary for issues that engender wider agreements, such as irregular migration. Yet even here, the degree of urgency and the resources to be allocated to this issue vary considerably in Europe.

Another challenge is that Europe now has different political anchors. For decades, agreements between France and Germany propelled the European project forward, and were sufficient to give their common positions on any issue enough gravitas to become European policy. This is no longer the case. Not only has the European Union expanded to include many members in the past two decades, but also the European project itself now has various definitions stemming from the experiences of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, whose interpretations of what Europe means and where it is to go, are not only different from those of countries in Western Europe, but also are becoming of sizeable weight in European decision making.

Even in Western Europe, consensus on Europe’s strategic objectives, could well be diluted in the not too distant future. This is because in many Western European countries, the rise of the far right threatens to shatter what seemed to be consensus on fundamental European values, including what was generally understood to be the key foundations of western liberal democracy. If the far right continues to rise - a far from negligible scenario - then several Western European societies might themselves face acute internal differences on their own strategic objectives.

Then, there is the problem of resources. Irrespective of the specific objectives entailed in it, strategic autonomy means commanding advanced ways of defending borders, key infrastructure, important interests in Europe’s neighbourhoods, and having serious means of projecting power. All of this costs money, which is no longer easily available, after the hundreds of billions borrowed, printed, and spent in the past 15 years since the financial crisis of 2008 and during and after COVID.

With all of that, there is a question about expertise. Procuring arms and developing serious military capabilities are complicated. For almost 70 years, NATO has provided most of Western Europe, and then almost the whole of Europe, with effectively all the key weapons and military kit they needed for defence. But dependency on NATO transcended weapons. NATO is the world’s most sophisticated military and security architecture, spanning strategic planning, technological capabilities, logistical chains, and a network of well equipped and staffed bases in different parts of the world, all supported by vast intelligence gathering efforts with major reach across the world. European strategic autonomy would entail developing alternatives to many of NATO’s resources and capabilities. Such an endeavour requires serious expertise in different disciplines.

Time has also brought changes. Since the end of the Second World War, Europe was the world’s most important geopolitical theatre. Geo-economics augmented Europe’s importance. In the period from the 1960s to the end of the twentieth century, European manufacturing became a strong driver of the global economy. And even after several Asian countries have emerged as key nodes of global manufacturing and in the value chains of important industries, Europe remained a leading centre of research and development and innovations, in addition to being a leading example in governance.

But now, geopolitical developments in East and North Asia are arguably more consequential to the world than those in Europe. And when it comes to geo-economics, Europe remains an important centre of innovation in different industries; and before and after, Europe is arguably the richest market in the world. But the rise of Asian research and development and innovation has lessened Europe’s centrality in several industries, including in technological areas that will shape the future of humanity, such as in quantum fields, bio-engineering, and artificial intelligence.

These challenges do not render strategic autonomy - and a serious European defence architecture - impossible. But they make the road to them difficult.

Challenges could be surmounted. Europe is one of the richest places in the world. And the European project remains the most successful in the world, relative to any other political project that has emerged in the period since the end of the Second World War. And so, Europe can certainly summon immense resources to confront these challenges. The key question, however, is: does Europe have the will to seek strategic autonomy and to build its own defence architecture. The next, and final article in this series, will address this question.