The idea that there is an Arab world that, because of the heritage of the Arabic language, shares many cultural traits, is almost universally accepted amongst most political classes in the region extending from the Gulf to Morocco. However, the stark differences in the conditions of the countries of this large region make the notion of Arabness contested in different ways, and importantly put Arab countries on different trajectories.

Arab nationalism was the most prominent political manifestation of Arabness in the past two hundred years. But all variants of Arab nationalism - from the Hashemite attempt at creating an united Arab kingdom at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the ideas that brought few Arab countries together into the Arab League immediately after World War Two, to the Nasserite project in the 1950s and 1960s - have now largely been consigned to history. Some pay them lip service. But there is no serious political project in the Arab world today that is inspired by, let alone adheres to, any of the tenets of Arab nationalism in any recognisable definition of that term.

Arab nationalism is not bankrupt so as to be discredited. But it is seen as belonging to a bygone era in which global geopolitics and Middle Eastern dynamics were very different from how they are these days.

There is a view that this is a loss to the Arab world, for at the core of all the manifestations of Arab nationalism there lied a sense of belonging to a group of societies that share more than a language and the cultural implications that emerge from that. This sense was neither an illusion nor a fabrication by the political powers of their times. It was anchored on a largely common, at least similar, readings of the histories of the peoples of the Gulf, the Levant, and North Africa in the past, at least, five centuries. These readings guided the consciousnesses of these societies towards quite similar objectives in terms of liberation from foreign influence and real development to catch up with a modernity that seemed far away from these societies’ grasp. The coming together of these societies from the Gulf, the Levant, and North Africa under that collective sense enriched the meaning of their struggle, for it made them believe that they are a nation, and it made them come across in front of the world as one, which at several times in modern history strengthened their collective or individual bargain.

Today while very few in the Arab political classes would dismiss the notion of Arabness and the subtle vague sense of an Arab nation, also very few would embrace Arabness and would seriously, not rhetorically, imbue it with anything more than cultural traits. Arabness and the notion of an Arab nation have arrived at destinations very different from where they had set out to go to.

This partly explains why Arab countries today are on different trajectories towards different destinations.

The Maghreb region is largely looking north to Europe for economic integration, primarily through energy and infrastructure and industrial value chains. This makes sense for that economic connection has proven for Maghreb countries to be the one with the highest economic and developmental yield in the past four decades. Some countries, particularly Morocco, has achieved notable successes in building valuable strategic, political, economic, and cultural presences in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, investments that are already starting to accrue significant benefits, again notably for Morocco. And so, the Maghreb’s eyes are focused on the northern shores of the Mediterranean and in some cases on opportunities south of the Sahara. The Arab Mashreq, however, seems distant, not only geographically but increasingly politically, economically, and culturally.

Many of the Arab countries in the long arc extending from the western reaches of the Levant to the north eastern Mediterranean down to east Africa are facing acute economic problems. Few have a chance to discern ways out of their economic labyrinths and to emerge as assertive agents able to participate in shaping their neighbourhoods. Another set of countries in this arc might escape their challenges if they manage to redesign their political economy to be competitive and relevant in an international and regional economic landscape that is being rapidly transformed. But these inescapable transformations will entail problematic internal realignments of power, which could well keep these countries reactive to what is happening around them, and struggling to find roles for themselves and to make their markets destinations of foreign and regional investments. The rest of the countries in this arc will likely remain mired in challenges that would not only further tax their societies, but could well exacerbate polarisations that have been growing for several years, if not decades. Some of the countries in this group might cease to exist in the coming decade or two.

The countries of the Arabian peninsula are in a different place. Something extremely important has been happening there in the past fifteen years. While most of the Arab world has been arduously navigating the Arab uprisings and their political and economic consequences, which had brought to the fore acute problems and the consequences of mismanagement of long decades before these uprisings, most of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula have been on a fast-paced upward developmental trajectory. Not just in urban development, finance, and technology - but also in education and exposure to the world, east and west. Crucially, a new generation of young Arabs in the Peninsula, by far better educated not just than any prior generation there but also than the vast majority of their counterparts in the rest of the Arab world, has been taking centre stage in various political, economic, cultural and artistic domains. The quality of their outputs are miles ahead of those in other parts of the Arab world, and that is why their work has much more potential to be integrated in international economic and technological networks than that emerging from all other parts of the Arab world.

Money helps. The now almost certain future demand for oil and gas (after a period in which renewable energy seemed to emerge as a serious threat to hydrocarbon fuel) meant not only colossal revenues to the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Crucially it secured their economic prospects in the foreseeable future. This instils confidence, and importantly strengthens their positioning in the global political economy, at a time when the US, most of Europe, and even several of the the rising Asian powers face political, economic, technological, and even demographic challenges.

All of this have widened the gap between the Arabian Peninsula and most of the rest of the Arab world - in terms of wealth and life standards, as well as in terms of exposure to the world, the way of interacting with the key western and eastern powers, and the kind of opportunities available to societies. This gap will likely continue to grow, because the countries of the Arabian Peninsula will probably improve and strengthen their positioning in some of the world’s most promising economic and technological networks - which by default strengthens their political positioning in key decision making circles in the world. And as that gap widens, many in the Arabian Peninsula, especially amongst the younger generations that have, at best, tenuous links to the notion of Arabness, would feel that their mindsets are in different places than where most other Arab mindsets are. They would feel much more comfortable interacting with counterparts in the US, Europe, and Asia than with fellow Arabs. There is a chance that a generation from today, large segments of the societies of the Arabian Peninsula would be mentally and culturally more related to parts of the west and the east than to the rest of the Arab world.

These diverging trajectories give rise to new geopolitical realities in the Arab world which the next part of this series will present.